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Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration:
An Empirical Study
Stephen J. Choi and Theodore Eisenberg
This article provides the first empirical analysis of punitive damages in securities arbitrations.
Using a data set of over 6,800 securities arbitration awards, we find that claimants prevailed
in 48.9 percent of arbitrations and that 9.1 percent of those claimant victories included a
punitive damages award. The existence of a punitive damages award was associated with
claims that suggested egregious misbehavior and with claims that provided higher compen-
satory awards. The pattern of punitive awards is more consistent with a traditional view of
punitive damages that incorporates a retributive component than with a law and economics
emphasis on efficient deterrence. We also report evidence that the relation between punitive
and compensatory awards did not differ substantially between the securities arbitrators’ data
and data on juries available from periodic Civil Justice Surveys by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s upheld mandatory arbitration
clauses for securities law claims contained in brokerage contracts (Rod-
riguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
[1989]; Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 [1987]).
Mandatory arbitration of customers’ securities claims is ubiquitous in
the securities industry (Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard 2010) but has been
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the subject of legislation to curtail or improve it.1 The availability of
punitive damages is a hotly contested issue in the securities arbitration
debate. More than a decade ago, a blue-ribbon task force observed that
no subject “has generated more controversy or so polarized opinion”
between the securities industry and investors as punitive damages’ avail-
ability in arbitration (Arbitration Policy Task Force 1996, p. 10). This
debate has occurred without empirical analysis of the frequency, amount,
or pattern of punitive damages awards in securities arbitrations.
Understanding how arbitrators have actually performed will promote
sound policy making with respect to the issue of punitive damages in
arbitration awards. Findings that arbitrators rarely award punitive dam-
ages would contribute to securities arbitration’s perceived anti-investor
bias, a matter of increasing discussion (Brunet and Johnson 2008; Choi,
Fisch, and Pritchard 2010; Little 2008; Schultz 2008). If arbitrators in
fact award punitive damages in a nontrivial fraction of cases, some of
the most extreme fears about arbitrators’ anti-investor bias may be di-
minished. Describing how arbitrators perform also helps assess whether
they apply punitive damages doctrine in a manner consistent with the
doctrine’s traditional dichotomous purpose of punishment and deter-
rence or more in accord with law and economics theorists’ emphasis on
pure deterrence. Studying punitive damages in an arbitration context
can also promote understanding of the more general questions of the
performance of arbitration compared to litigation and of the behavior
of legal professionals compared to that of lay decision makers such as
juries. These questions are especially important in light of the Supreme
Court’s use in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (128 S. Ct. 2605 [2008])
of the perceived variability of punitive awards by juries to support limits
on punitive damages in litigation.
This article provides the first systematic, empirical analysis of punitive
damages awards in arbitration. Using a data set of 6,803 securities ar-
bitration awards, we find that claimants prevailed in 48.9 percent of
arbitrations and that 304 (9.1 percent) of those claimant victories in-
cluded a punitive damages award. The likelihood of punitive awards
was associated with investor claims that suggested egregious broker mis-
behavior and with claims that provided high compensatory awards, more
consistent with the traditional purpose of punitive damages than with
1. Pending bills in recent years include Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, 110th Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 12, 2007), and Drive America Forward Act of 2009, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
(April 17, 2007).
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the law and economics approach. The Supreme Court’s 1995 ruling in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (514 U.S. 52 [1995]),
which allowed securities arbitrators to award punitive damages not-
withstanding New York’s ban on punitive awards by arbitrators, was
associated with an increase in the rate of punitive awards, but punitive
award rates have declined in recent years. Punitive award amounts in
our data set averaged $447,000, with a median of $110,000, and the
amount of punitive damages was strongly associated with the size of the
compensatory award. The pattern of punitive awards across types of
claims is consistent with a substantial retributive component for punitive
damages and less consistent with punitive damages as a vehicle to pro-
mote efficient deterrence. The relation between punitive and compen-
satory awards did not differ substantially between securities arbitrators
in this study and juries in Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data. The
rate of punitive awards by arbitrators was higher than the overall rates
of juries or judges and somewhat lower than the rates of punitive awards
by juries in cases without bodily injury.
Section 2 of this article describes the expected pattern of punitive dam-
ages awards in light of leading conceptual frameworks related to their use,
with separate consideration of the decision to award punitive damages and
the level of punitive damages given a punitive damages award. It also reviews
the relevant prior literature on punitive damages and securities arbitration.
Section 3 reports the empirical results, and Section 4 discusses them, with
special attention to the relation between punitive awards in arbitration and
those in litigation. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE EXPECTED PATTERN OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
This section first sets forth relevant conceptual frameworks to motivate
and interpret our results and then reviews the prior empirical literature
on punitive damages and securities arbitrations. It then discusses several
factors we expect to be associated with whether an arbitrator awarded
punitive damages: the type of claim and the level of compensatory award,
locale, and changes in governing law over time. The section then ad-
dresses these factors’ relation to punitive awards.
2.1. Conceptual Frameworks Relevant to Punitive Damages
No single conceptual framework is the uniformly accepted basis for
punitive damages. Sebok (2007, p. 960) traces the mixed bases for pu-
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nitive damages to the fact that “the historical record in most complex
common-law doctrines is underdeterminative since lines of cases contain
conflicting patterns of decision.” Nevertheless, two conceptions of pu-
nitive damages relevant to this study can be articulated. One view, which
we refer to as the traditional view, draws heavily on the existing state
of punitive damages doctrine and regards punitive damages as appro-
priate both to punish and to deter wrongful behavior. For example, in
the decades-long litigation growing out of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil
spill, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the trial court had “in-
structed the jurors on the purposes of punitive damages, emphasizing
that they were designed not to provide compensatory relief but to punish
and deter the defendants” (128 S. Ct. 2614). This dual function of
punitive damages dominates state law, is the black-letter-law justification
for punitive damages’ existence, and, as in Exxon, is a common basis
for explanations of punitive damages to juries.2
In the traditional view, punitive damages both serve the core deterrent
function of tort law and incorporate a retributive component related to
criminal law. The retributive aspect of punitive damages suggests that
(1) more egregious misbehavior should be associated with a higher prob-
ability of a punitive award, and (2) greater harm should be associated
with increased awards of punitive damages, independent of the egre-
giousness of misbehavior.
The first expected result under the traditional view is almost a tau-
tology and does not seem open to serious question. The second result
may be less self-evident. Criminal law almost uniformly punishes failed
attempts less harshly (if at all) than it does completed attempts (Eisenberg
et al. 1997, p. 628). Attempted murderers may be no less morally cul-
pable than successful murderers, and in need of as much deterrence. Yet
we punish attempted murders less harshly than successful murders, even
to the extreme of allowing capital punishment in the latter case but not
the former. Retribution is at work in the traditional view of punitive
damages as well as in criminal law—justifying greater punitive damages
where the compensatory level of harm is higher. Experimental evidence
suggests that, controlling for the moral culpability of behavior, greater
punitive damages are awarded when harm results than when it does not
(Darley et al. 2010). Whether increased punishment for greater harm,
2. A typical jury instruction on punitive damages asks the jury to “award an amount
which will serve to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from similar
conduct” (Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil Cases 2006, sec.
35.01, p. 175).
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holding behavior constant, is normatively correct may be debated (Hart
1965, pp. 52–53; Schulhofer 1974, pp. 1601–3), but it is descriptively
accurate as a component of what adjudicators, according to the tradi-
tional view, may do in assessing punitive damages. Retribution is part
of the conceptual framework implemented by both punitive criminal law
and punitive damages in civil law.
One test of whether a legal system implements the retributive aspect
of punitive damages is whether a proxy for the egregiousness of mis-
behavior, the type of claim, is associated with the presence of a punitive
award. Claim types, such as theft, reasonably believed to be more as-
sociated, on average, with more egregious misbehavior, ought to trigger
punishment at a higher rate than claim types associated with less egre-
gious misbehavior. A second test is whether adjudicators punish behavior
more by awarding increasing punitive damages as the level of harm in-
creases.
Another framework advocated for the function of punitive damages,
prominent in the law and economics literature, limits the role of punitive
damages to deterrence. For example, according to Polinsky and Shavell
(1998), punitive damages outcomes should be related to the probability
of detection of the wrongful act, as when defendants believe ex ante that
wrongful conduct would not be detected. They argue that the “total
damages imposed on an injurer should equal the harm multiplied by the
reciprocal of the probability that the injurer will be found liable when
he ought to be” (p. 889). This approach downplays the importance of
the moral reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct to determining the
existence or amount of punitive damages.3 The probability-of-detection
framework suggests that the total damages award should be inversely
associated with the probability of detection. For any given level of harm,
less need exists to deter behavior that has a high likelihood of detection.
In the extreme, even highly egregious acts support no punitive damages
if they are highly likely to be detected and are not done for the purpose
of causing harm (Polinsky and Shavell 1998, p. 958). Under this view,
for example, Polinsky and Shavell argue that the high probability of
detection of the oil spill in the Exxon case warranted no punitive dam-
3. Polinsky and Shavell (1998, pp. 905–6) state, “Should reprehensibility per se affect
the imposition of punitive damages given the goal of deterrence? In this section, we explain
that it generally should not.”
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ages at all, in contrast to the $5 billion award by the jury and the $500
million approved by the Supreme Court.4
Using observational data to distinguish between the traditional view and
the law and economics view has limitations in part because the two views
generate potentially overlapping hypotheses. The traditional view implies
that punitive awards should increase with the egregiousness of the behavior
and the size of the harm. But so possibly does the law and economics view.
Holding the probability of detection constant, the law and economics view
implies that the size of the total award should be positively correlated with
the harm. If the amount of compensatory award is insufficient given the
size of the harm, decision makers may use the punitive award to increase
the total award consistent with the law and economics view. Although
greater harm could correlate with an increased probability of detection,
which implies a negative relation between the harm and the punitive award,
it also is plausible that the primary effect—greater harm is associated with
a larger punitive award—dominates under the law and economics view.
With respect to egregiousness, it is plausible that more egregious harms or
behavior generate relatively larger external costs. If so, then the law and
economics view implies that the punitive award should be increasing with
egregiousness as under the traditional view. While acknowledging the po-
tentially overlapping aspects of the two views, we attempt below to distin-
guish between the views using our arbitration punitive award data set.
Moreover, one should expect the traditional view to dominate observational
data since guidelines for judges and juries tend to embody that view.5
2.2. Prior Empirical Literature on Punitive Damages and Securities
Arbitrations
Virtually all empirical studies of punitive damages in court-based liti-
gation find them to be infrequently awarded (Eaton, Mustard, and Ta-
larico 2005; Eaton, Talarico, and Dunn 2000, p. 1094; Eisenberg et al.
4. Polinsky and Shavell (1998, p. 904) state, “It seems clear that in the circumstances
of the Exxon Valdez accident, there was essentially no chance that the defendant company,
Exxon Corporation, could escape liability. An accident of this magnitude obviously would
have been noticed. Moreover, because the tanker was stuck on a reef, the identity of the
injurer was plain. And given the substantial compensatory damages involved, in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, a lawsuit certainly could be expected. Thus, according to our
analysis, no punitive damages are needed, or appropriate, in the circumstances of this case
because the injurer could not have escaped liability for compensatory damages.”
5. Polinsky and Shavell recognize this reality because, notwithstanding their theoretical
objections to a punishment rationale, they incorporate a punishment rationale for punitive
damages in their model jury instructions (Polinsky and Shavell 1998, pp. 957–62).
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1997, 2002; Vidmar and Rose 2001), with a rate of about 3–5 percent
of plaintiff trial wins (see, for example, Eisenberg et al. 2006, p. 268),
and to be more likely to be awarded in cases of intentional misbehavior
(Eisenberg et al. 1997; Moller 1996). Evidence also suggests that judges
and juries award punitive damages at about the same rate (Eisenberg et
al. 2006) and that punitive awards are more frequent in cases of financial
injury than in cases of personal injury (Moller, Pace, and Carroll 1999).6
Geographical variation in award patterns has been observed (Eisenberg
et al. 1997).
With respect to punitive award amounts, it was once thought, even
in liberal circles, that jurors pulled the amounts comprising punitive
damages awards “out of the air” (Washington Post 1996, p. A16). Ac-
ademics accepted this conventional wisdom (Cooter 1989, pp. 1145–
46; Ellis 1982, pp. 55–60; 1989, pp. 975–76, 987–88; Huber 1989, p.
1037; Jeffries 1986; Wheeler 1989, pp. 940–41), and an Exxon-funded
research program on punitive damages reinforced the view that punitive
damages awards were too unpredictable (Hastie and Viscusi 1998, p.
916; Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman 2000, p. 1173; Sunstein, Kahn-
eman, and Schkade 1998, p. 2078; Sunstein et al. 2002).7 Beginning in
the 1990s, however, virtually every empirical study of court-based pu-
nitive damages has revealed a strong, statistically significant correlation
between punitive and compensatory damages (Eisenberg et al. 1997,
2002, 2006; Eisenberg and Wells 1998, 1999; Karpoff and Lott 1999,
p. 543; Moller, Pace, and Carroll 1999, p. 300; Schlanger 2003, p. 1605;
Sharkey 2006). Even the largest punitive damages awards, those that
were $100 million or greater, showed a statistically significant associa-
tion with the compensatory award (Eisenberg and Wells 2006). To the
extent that the size of the compensatory award correlates with the degree
of harm and egregiousness of the underlying wrongdoing, this correla-
tion indicates that court-based punitive damages are not random but
instead also correlate with harm and egregiousness (the traditional view).
Although studies of punitive awards in securities arbitration have not
been conducted, two studies report findings suggesting that a 1998 re-
form of securities arbitration by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD, now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
6. Evidence also exists that juries award punitive damages more frequently than do
judges in cases not involving bodily injury and that judges award punitive damages more
frequently than do juries in cases involving bodily injury (Eisenberg et al. 2006).
7. But the Exxon-funded researchers did not attempt to reconcile experimental findings
with real-world data about punitive damages (Eisenberg, Rachlinski, and Wells 2002).
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thority, or FINRA) led to arbitration outcomes decreasingly favorable
to contestants. Since November 1998, arbitrators have been chosen
through a list selection system administered by the NASD director of
dispute resolution, termed the neutral list selection system (NLSS).8 The
1998 reforms allowed both claimants and respondents in securities ar-
bitration a degree of choice in selecting the arbitrators. Choi, Fisch, and
Pritchard (2010) report that the 1998 reform’s implementation of greater
party involvement in the selection process is associated with reduced
investor arbitration awards. They conclude that the reduction is incon-
sistent with the view that this reform assisted investor-claimants (and
consistent with the view that increased choice favored repeat-player,
brokerage firm respondents). Kondo (2009) found that the 1998 reforms
resulted in more pro-brokerage-firm arbitrators, suggesting that party
control over panel composition favored repeat players over one-shot
claimants. Neither study focused on punitive damages, although their
findings suggest the importance of sensitivity of results to changes over
time in the regulatory framework governing securities arbitration.
Observers have also noted a trend toward claimants prevailing at a
lower rate over time in securities arbitration proceedings. While claim-
ants prevailed in 53–61 percent of awards from 1997 to 2002, they
prevailed in only 43 percent of awards in 2005, 42 percent in 2006, and
37 percent in 2007 (Schultz 2008, p. 365). This decline is consistent
with findings concerning selection of pro-brokerage-firm arbitrators
(Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard 2010; Kondo 2009). Industry explanations
for the decline have not been fully satisfactory (Schultz 2008, pp. 358–
59). This raises the possibility that we might expect to observe a decline
in punitive award rates or amounts in recent years.
Both the empirical securities arbitration literature and the punitive
damages litigation literature tend to focus more on the traditional con-
ceptual framework for punitive damages than on the law and economics
probability-of-detection framework. We suspect this is because of dif-
ficulties in acquiring systematic data about the probability of detection.
We discuss the possible implications of our findings for the law and
economics approach.
8. The neutral list selection system (NLSS) went into effect on November 17, 1998. The
NLSS was proposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Arbitration
Policy Task Force as part of its 1996 report Securities Arbitration Reform and modeled
after the list selection system used by the American Arbitration Association. The report
also made controversial recommendations concerning the availability of punitive damages
in arbitration awards (Arbitration Policy Task Force 1996).
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2.3. The Decision to Award Punitive Damages
We focus on the claim type and the level of the compensatory award as
factors to consider in exploring punitive damages in securities arbitra-
tions. Since we have no case-level measures of the probability of detec-
tion, we use the claim type as a rough measure of the probability of
detection when reporting our core results. Locale and changes in the
legal environment regulating securities arbitrations are additional factors
expected to be associated with patterns of punitive awards.
2.3.1. Claim Type and Compensatory Award Size. Arbitrators generally
apply the punitive damages doctrine of the governing law specified in a
contract (for example, Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Cucchiella,
594 N.E.2d 870 [1992]).9 Punitive damages doctrine across the states,
with reasonable consistency, requires egregious behavior to support an
award, behavior beyond that present in most malfeasance (for example,
Rustad 2008, p. 491). Independent of the state law governing a specific
arbitration, investor claims associated with more egregious behavior
should be more likely to be associated with a punitive award.
We conjecture that alleged malfeasance leading to client recovery in
the context of securities disputes often will be run-of-the-mill overag-
gressive salesmanship or failure to comply with rules governing relations
between customers and brokers, such as New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and FINRA rules. For example, NYSE Rule 405(1) requires
brokers to “[u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer” in order to know their customers financially to avoid
recommending inappropriate investments; FINRA Rule 2310(a) states
9. As discussed below, that law is sometimes interpreted in light of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) to allow punitive damages under some circumstances not authorized by
state law. See, for example, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (514 U.S. 52,
59 [1995]), a New York case prohibiting punitive damages by arbitrators that did not
preclude punitive damages in securities arbitrations subject to the FAA; Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. (835 F.2d 1378 [11th Cir. 1988]), in which a choice-of-law provision
in a securities contract governed by the FAA did not deprive arbitrators of the authority
to award punitive damages; Kelley v. Michaels (830 F. Supp. 577 [N.D. Okla. 1993]), which
held that punitive damages were available notwithstanding the New York choice of law;
Pyle v. Securities U.S.A., Inc. (758 F. Supp. 638 [D. Colo. 1991]), which held that a
Colorado arbitration law restricting an arbitrator’s power to award punitive damages was
inapplicable to action governed by the FAA absent agreement between the parties that state
law would govern; Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima Intern., Inc. (598
F. Supp. 353, 359 [D. Ala. 1984]), which held that punitive damages were allowed under
authority of the FAA under an agreement where Alabama law governed; and Willis v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. (569 F. Supp. 821 [M.D.N.C. 1983]).
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that brokers’ recommendations shall be based on “reasonable grounds
for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer.”
Most wrong-doing brokers are likely insufficiently competent, too
eager to generate commissions by trading but lacking venal motives, or
insufficiently attentive to diligence rules such as NYSE Rule 405 or
FINRA Rule 2310. In contrast, the kind of egregious or intentional
misbehavior warranting a punitive award under the traditional view
should be fairly rare, even in cases in which clients recover. In this respect,
we expect that the frequency of arbitration punitive awards will resemble
that of tort litigation punitive awards. As noted elsewhere, the traditional
view of the nature and purpose of punitive damages suggests they will
be rarely awarded in most arbitration case categories but more frequently
awarded in cases of intentional misbehavior (Eisenberg et al. 1997, p.
626).
Not all cases of broker misbehavior that could support a punitive
award will necessarily lead to an award. The compensatory award given
in arbitration already vindicates the claimant and adversely labels the
wrongdoer. It is not necessary or required to find the enhanced misbe-
havior that would be needed to support a punitive award. Given ade-
quate compensation, the further step of a punitive award should be
reserved only for egregious cases because an arbitrator’s punitive award,
like punitive damages from a judge or jury, punishes without criminal
procedural safeguards. We therefore expect arbitrators, like jurors (Ei-
senberg et al. 1997, p. 626), to err on the side of false negatives rather
than false positives. We expect that an arbitrator who has already ruled
against a broker should be more willing to err on the side of not imposing
punitive damages when they might be warranted than on the side of
imposing punitive damages when they are not warranted. Legislatures
or courts that supply legal standards for litigation and arbitration often
require greater certainty by demanding “clear and convincing” evidence
to support a punitive award (Dobbs 1989, p. 837).
Under the traditional view of punitive damages, against a background
of general reluctance to award punitive damages, the nature of an in-
vestor’s claim against a broker should correlate with whether the alleged
behavior might support a punitive damages award. For example, brokers
who have stolen funds from clients should be more likely to suffer pu-
nitive awards than brokers who merely negligently failed to execute
client orders, failed to timely rebalance a portfolio, or committed a
technical rule violation. A finding adverse to the broker in the case of
theft suggests the presence of the kind of willful behavior that would
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support a punitive award. While failures to execute transactions can
become so egregious as to warrant punitive awards, the failure to execute
a transaction, standing alone, normally would not support an inference
of egregious or willful misbehavior. The nature of an investor’s claim is
thus one proxy for the degree of misbehavior.
The claim type can also serve as a proxy for the probability of de-
tection of a wrongful act. As discussed above, varying the probability
of detection has implications for the law and economics framework for
evaluating punitive damages. And some of the implications differ from
the implications of claim type for the traditional view. For example, we
assume the probability of detection of theft to be higher than the prob-
ability of detection of less objective wrongs. Misbehavior limited to
failure to follow regulatory rules, for example, is likely more subtle and
less readily detectable than theft. In contrast with the traditional view,
and holding other factors constant, the law and economics approach
would lead to a higher probability of punitive damages for a failure to
follow regulatory rules (which has a low probability of detection) than
for theft (which has a higher probability of detection), for the same level
of harm.
The amount of harm (as measured by the compensatory damages),
under the traditional view, should also be positively associated with the
likelihood of a punitive award. Both the traditional view of punitive
damages and many prior empirical studies of court-based punitive dam-
ages in litigation lead us to hypothesize that the likelihood of arbitrators’
punitive damages awards will be associated with the size of the com-
pensatory award (Eisenberg et al. 2010).10 Under the traditional view,
awards of punitive damages ought to reflect the “harm caused, the egre-
giousness of the misbehavior, and the amount needed to accomplish the
goals of punishment or deterrence” (Eisenberg et al. 1997, p. 628).
Holding the egregiousness of behavior constant, the law tends to
punish more harmful acts more harshly than less harmful acts. For ex-
ample, if the same Exxon Valdez that ran aground and caused billions
10. The causal relationship between the compensatory award and the punitive award is
potentially complicated. Unobservable factors that indicate egregious, intentional conduct
could lead directly to both higher compensatory awards and punitive damages. Alterna-
tively, egregious conduct may lead to a larger compensatory award. The larger compen-
satory award, in turn, may give arbitrators greater leeway to award punitive damages (for
example, who would question a punitive award against someone who was already judged
a wrongdoer and made to pay a large compensatory award?). In each of these possible
causal chains, more egregious conduct nonetheless will correlate with both greater com-
pensatory awards and an increased likelihood of punitive awards.
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of dollars of damage had been piloted by the same drunk captain but
instead had run aground and spilled 1 quart of oil, causing mere hun-
dreds of dollars of damage, the punitive award would not have been $5
billion (eventually reduced to $500 million).11 Even intentional acts gen-
erally receive less punishment if they cause less harm. Criminal law
punishes attempts less harshly than completed wrongful acts.12
The expected observed relation between punitive and compensatory
awards under the law and economics approach is less clear. Direct evi-
dence of a key characteristic under the law and economics approach—the
probability of detection—is usually unavailable. The size of the harm,
as measured by the compensatory award, may be associated with an
increased probability of detection. It seems plausible that greater harm
is more likely to be detected than less harm. A broker who steals $1 per
month from a client is less likely to be caught than a broker who steals
$1,000 per month from a similar client. This suggests that we might
expect, within a claim type, an inverse association between the proba-
bility of a punitive award and the size of the compensatory award. But,
as noted above, greater harm and increased egregiousness may also be
associated with a larger punitive award under the law and economics
view. So the association of increased harm with reduced punitive awards
through a reduced probability of detection may be offset by its positive
association with punitive awards through its direct effect on the size of
the appropriate total award.
2.3.2. Geographical Variation. We hypothesize that the state in which
the arbitration occurred is associated with the existence or size of pu-
nitive damages in arbitrations for three reasons. First, broker-customer
contracts can specify a reasonable choice of law,13 which provides the
rules at least partly governing punitive damages. Second, states may serve
as a proxy for uncodified practices that shape legal outcomes. Third,
11. The award was reduced en route to the Supreme Court by lower courts and by the
Supreme Court to $500 million in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
12. Using the level of harm to assess punitive damages can be distinguished from using
the harm to determine compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are the measure
of harm. Punitive damages can use this measure to assess the degree of punishment or
deterrence needed. See Eisenberg et al. (1997, p. 628).
13. For examples of contracts specifying that New York law shall govern in disputes
resolved in other states, see Kelley v. Michaels (830 F. Supp. 577 [N.D. Okla. 1993]), and
Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Cucchiella (594 N.E.2d 870 [1992]), a securities
arbitration with New York choice of law in which punitive damages were not allowed.
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states’ distinctive socioeconomic characteristics may be associated with
the granting of punitive awards and their amounts.
As noted above, prior studies of court-based punitive awards also
suggest geographical variation (for example, Eisenberg et al. 1997, pp.
630–32). Such variation is of course not unique to punitive damages.
Geographical variation in legal case outcomes, whether or not involving
punitive damages, is the norm (Eisenberg et al. 1997, pp. 630–32). Even
within a single legal subject area, such as this study’s focus solely on
securities issues, geographical variation emerges. For example, the out-
comes of federal securities cases and federal civil rights trials, the rate
at which bankruptcies are filed, the mode of bankruptcy filing, and the
outcome of bankruptcy cases show strong geographical effects despite
their shared substantive areas and presumably shared governing federal
legal rules (see, for example, Eisenberg et al. 1997; Eisenberg 1989;
Pritchard and Sale 2005; Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1989, 1994).
Geographical variation in adjudicated outcomes is not limited to the
United States. Countries with more homogeneous populations, with uni-
fied legal systems, such as Japan, Sweden, and Finland, exhibit geo-
graphical variation in the patterns of legal case outcomes (Eisenberg
1995; Eisenberg and Tagashira 1994; Sundgren 1998).
2.3.3. Time and Law Reforms. The data analyzed here span 15 years.
Aside from general legal developments over time, the date of an arbi-
tration award might be expected to be associated with several devel-
opments. Since New York often is the choice of law in finance contracts
and in broker-customer agreements,14 developments in New York law
are directly relevant to the expected rate of arbitration punitive awards.
In 1976, in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. (40 N.Y.2d 354, 356 [1976]),
the New York Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of public policy,
judges may award punitive damages but arbitrators may not. Although
subsequent decisions partly eroded Garrity,15 it was still exercising im-
portant influence at the time of the earliest awards in this study. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 1991, just
before the earliest awards in our data, that the public policy expressed
14. See, for example, Kelley v. Michaels (830 F. Supp. 577 [N.D. Okla. 1993]), which
held that punitive damages were available in an Oklahoma case notwithstanding New York
choice of law, and Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Cucchiella (594 N.E.2d 870
[1992]), a securities arbitration with New York choice of law in which punitive damages
were not allowed.
15. See note 20.
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in Garrity against punitive damages in arbitration was not preempted
by the FAA (Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 [2d
Cir. 1991]). Securities industry defendants relied on Garrity to challenge
punitive damages awards, and one such case reached the Supreme Court.
On March 7, 1995, the Supreme Court held, in Mastrobuono, that New
York’s prohibition on punitive damages by arbitrators did not preclude
punitive damages in securities arbitrations subject to the FAA. The con-
tract in Mastrobuono contained an arbitration clause in which the parties
agreed to mandatory arbitration of all disputes under NASD rules that
had been held to permit arbitrators to award punitive damages (514
U.S. 58–61). The Court held that “if contracting parties agree to include
claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA
ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even
if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbi-
tration” (514 U.S. 58).
Although Mastrobuono might have permitted changes to the NASD
rules to preclude punitive damages, the securities industry did not follow
that route. In January 1996, less than a year after Mastrobuono, the
NASD’s Arbitration Policy Task Force (1996, p. 2) noted the controversy
over punitive damages and recommended that they remain available
subject to a cap in the state of the investor’s domicile to the same extent
they would be available in court for the same claims. The NASD rules
did not prohibit punitive damages, and the proposed caps have not been
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration (2007, p. 31) continues to indicate
that punitive damages may be awarded in arbitration.
Mastrobuono’s undermining of Garrity suggests that the rate of pu-
nitive awards may have increased after Mastrobuono, with some ques-
tion about whether arbitrators would have applied it to contracts entered
into prior to the decision. At least one New York federal court found
Mastrobuono to apply retroactively (Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v.
Marriner, 961 F. Supp. 50, 55 n.6 [S.D.N.Y. 1997]), although whether
it was universally construed by arbitrators to apply to contracts entered
into prior to March 7, 1995, is not known. Even after Mastrobuono, a
New York court continued to prohibit punitive awards in securities ar-
bitration under some circumstances (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Trim-
ble, 631 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217–18 [N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 1995]).16 Despite
16. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., distinguished Mastrobuono on the ground that it had
a written contract. But see Matter of Prudential Securities Inc. (Pesce), 642 N.Y.S.2d 466,
468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (distinguishing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.).
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possible delays and inconsistency in Mastrobuono’s implementation, the
decision likely increased the rate of punitive damages awards in securities
arbitrations, a topic we explore in Section 3.
Since many brokerage contracts outside of New York select New York
law, fully isolating the effect of Mastrobuono is not possible because we
lack the choice-of-law provisions applicable to each of the arbitrations
in our sample. We can, however, use arbitrations whose hearings took
place in New York as a proxy for the presence of a New York choice-
of-law provision. We can then assess whether the rate of punitive awards
changed in New York disputes relative to other disputes around the time
of Mastrobuono.
In addition to Mastrobuono’s direct effect on the availability of pu-
nitive awards, two reforms of the FINRA arbitration system, not specific
to punitive damages, might be expected to generate changes over time
in punitive damages award rates. Reforms adopted in 1998 and 2004
by the NASD were intended to promote fairness in the face of criticism
of the arbitration process. As discussed above, the 1998 reforms shifted
the selection of arbitrators from the NASD to the parties. The 2004
reforms narrowed the definition of a public arbitrator by excluding those
with a broader range of personal and professional ties to the securities
industry. One might therefore expect increased punitive award activity
after those reforms. Mastrobuono and the FINRA reforms establish the
importance of accounting for effects over time in assessing the pattern
of punitive awards in securities arbitration.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Data Description
Virtually all brokerage customer agreements contain a clause requiring
disputes between the customer and the broker to be submitted to ar-
bitration. The vast majority of these arbitrations take place in a forum
administered by FINRA. During the period studied here, FINRA or its
predecessor, NASD, handled approximately 90 percent of customer
claims against brokers (the remaining 10 percent were handled by the
NYSE). The number of claims filed per year fluctuates, averaging 5,000
to 6,000 cases and peaking at almost 9,000 in 2003. Since 1996, NASD/
FINRA has handled approximately 70,000 claims. The FINRA arbitra-
tions involving requested awards of $50,000 or more are decided by
panels of three arbitrators: one industry arbitrator and two public ar-
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Table 1. Arbitration Awards, 1992–2006
Mean Median N
Punitive award 446,725 109,844 304
Compensatory award 156,077 43,653 3,329
Compensatory award in cases with
punitive award 410,707 113,130 304
Note. The data consist of 6,803 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers awards decided by 418 arbitrators. Mean and median values are
in inflation-adjusted 2007 dollars.
bitrators. These are chosen from a pool of almost 7,000 available ar-
bitrators of whom approximately 58 percent are public arbitrators and
42 percent are industry arbitrators.
The arbitration awards studied here come from the FINRA awards
Web site17 and from the LexisNexis database. For a research project
concerning the influence of arbitrators on awards, Choi, Fisch, and Prit-
chard (2010) generated a random sample of 422 arbitrators who ad-
judicated disputes that resulted in awards from 1998 to 2000. For each
of the 422 arbitrators, information was coded for awards involving an
investor-claimant from November 1, 1992, to December 31, 2006. Choi,
Fisch, and Pritchard identified the chair in each arbitration award and
focused on chairs to select those arbitrators who were more likely to
have influence over arbitrations. All of the selected arbitrators retained
in the sample were public arbitrators and not the industry representatives
on the panels. We also eliminated disputes in which data about either
the compensatory or the punitive award were missing. This sample
yielded 6,803 awards suitable for analysis in this study. In the sample,
82.2 percent of the public arbitrators were attorneys.
Of the 6,803 awards, 3,329 resulted in a compensatory award to the
investor-claimant, a claimant victory rate of 48.9 percent. These 3,329
awards included 304 disputes (9.1 percent) with a punitive award. The
arbitrators averaged about 16 awards each. The state in which awards
were made was missing for 1,041 of the 6,803 cases (15.3 percent). For
an arbitrator for whom available data showed arbitrations in only one
state, that state was imputed to be the state of arbitration for other
awards by that arbitrator. This reduced the number of observations with
missing state data to 456 (6.7 percent). Table 1 provides summary sta-
17. See FINRA Arbitration Awards Online (http://finraawardsonline.finra.org).
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tistics. Note that compensatory awards in cases with punitive awards
were substantially higher than those in the mass of claimant victories.
3.2. Methodology
Our methodology in analyzing the data is largely straightforward given
our primarily quantitative interests, but discussion of the regression tech-
niques used after we report the more descriptive statistics may be helpful.
The empirical literature and case law on punitive damages have been
dominated by two questions: (1) What is the likelihood of a punitive
award? and (2) Conditional on the existence of a compensatory award
and a punitive award, what is the relation between the two awards? The
former question has been the subject of policy interest, with a special
emphasis on the difference, if any, in punitive damages award rates
between juries and judges (see, for example, Hersch and Viscusi 2004).
The latter question has repeatedly risen to the level of federal consti-
tutional concern (for example, BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 [1996]). To
promote comparability of our arbitration results with prior litigation
results, we use regression techniques that focus on these two questions:
logistic regression to model the decision to award punitive damages and
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and robust regression to model
the level of punitive damages given a compensatory award. We support
the possible causal inference for the logistic model using a separate pro-
pensity score analysis and the robustness of the results using a Tobit
model.
If the research question of primary concern were the expected amount
of punitive awards, not conditioned on a claimant having received a
compensatory award, selection models (Heckman 1979) or, more likely,
two-part models (for example, Dow and Norton 2003; Eisenberg, Wells,
and Zhang 2009) might be appropriate, but the choice of appropriate
models in the presence of many zero values is not always clear (Buntin
and Zaslavsky 2004). Selection models have severe limitations given the
available data.18 Since our interest, in light of the literature and doctrine
18. In this context, selection models that would first model the decision to award punitive
damages and then, for arbitration awards with positive punitive awards, model the level
of the award are also possibly relevant. Successful use of these models depends in part on
having available different covariates for the selection equation than those used in the level
equation. Otherwise, the regressors in the selection equation and the inverse Mills ratio
used in selection models (as a function of the regressors in the level equation) can generate
severe multicollinearity problems (Leung and Yu 1996). The availability of different co-
variate structures is unlikely here since the covariates that likely explain whether a punitive
award is obtained, such as claim type and amount of harm, also may explain the level of
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on punitive damages reviewed above, is not the unconditional expected
amount of punitive awards, we do not address the methodological issues
raised by estimating that amount.
3.3. Results: The Decision to Award Punitive Damages
We first focus on the likelihood of a punitive damages award. Table 2
reports the rate at which punitive damages were awarded in arbitrations
in which the claimant received a compensatory award. Since disputes
can involve more than one claim, overlap exists across the types of claims
made. The percentages of arbitration claim victories are based on the
subset of 3,329 cases in which the claimant received a compensatory
award. Thus, for example, the first row shows that claimants won 48.9
percent of disputes that included a claim of suitability and the like, that
punitive damages were awarded in 9.9 percent of these successful claims,
and that this rate of punitive awards differed from the rate of punitive
awards in cases not involving a suitability claim at a significance level
of p p .15.
Table 2 shows substantial variation in punitive award rates by type
of claim. Punitive damages were awarded at the highest rate, about 18
percent, in the small subset of cases that alleged theft and the like.
Punitive damages were awarded at the lowest rate in cases involving
failures to execute or monitor the account. Both of these rates statistically
significantly differ from the rate at which punitive damages were
awarded in disputes that did not include these claims.
The rate of punitive awards largely conforms to the traditional view’s
expected pattern of more wrongful behavior being associated with a
higher rate of punitive awards. The claim types with the highest rate of
punitive damage awards, theft and unauthorized trades, involve affir-
mative acts of misbehavior. The claim type with the lowest rate of pu-
nitive awards involves failures to act or to monitor errors—no inten-
tional misbehavior need be established to prevail on these claims. The
claim type with the second lowest rate of punitive awards (suitability,
know your customer, NYSE Rule 405, or NASD Rule 2310) likely in-
volves a higher rate of mere negligent behavior than the two claim types
with higher rates of punitive awards. The other two claim types likely
positive punitive awards. Selection models’ utility in the present context is also limited
because they assume an unobserved latent outcome for observations that lack a positive
selection equation outcome. The arbitration data have some nonlatent zero awards of
punitive damages; the punitive award is not necessarily unobserved because of selection.
It is sometimes observed and is equal to zero.
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include behavior where there is disagreement about what happened or
why it happened and present less clear instances of cases suitable or
unsuitable for punitive awards.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the pattern of punitive awards
by claim type is also consistent with the law and economics view that
the decision to award punitive damages should be inversely associated
with the probability of detection. Nonetheless, the law and economics
framework draws only mixed support from the claim-type data. Claims
involving theft seem highly likely to be detected, which suggests that
punitive awards are less necessary to deter such behavior and should be
awarded at relatively low rates. Yet Table 2 shows a relatively high rate
of punitive awards for theft claims. On the other hand, failure to execute
a trade would seem to involve a high probability of detection, and,
consistent with the law and economics view, there is a low rate of pu-
nitive awards for such claims. Churning claims, which might be expected
to be more difficult to detect than theft or failure-to-execute claims,
provide no clear direction, as their rate of punitive damages is not ma-
terially different from that of claims as a whole.
Table 3 reports the pattern of awards by state. For ease of presen-
tation, we aggregate states with fewer than 100 awards into a residual
category, “other.” Together, New York and California account for more
than one-third, almost 2,500, of the awards. Only one other state, Flor-
ida, accounts for more than 10 percent of the sample. With the exception
of Michigan, all states have a claimant victory rate (via a positive award)
ranging from 45.1 percent to 53.1 percent. Excluding Michigan, the
difference in claimant victory rates across all states combined is not
statistically significant ( [15] p 19.27; p p .202); including Michigan2x
yields (16) p 33.79 (p p .006).2x
The variation in punitive award rates shown in the last column of
Table 3, for cases with a positive compensatory award, is statistically
significant ( [16] p 58.91; p ! .001), with a range from 22.5 percent2x
in Georgia to 2.8 percent in Michigan. The low rate of punitive awards
in Michigan may be due to limitations on punitive award availability in
that state to merely punish,19 to Michigan arbitrators’ hostility to claim-
19. Michigan case law indicates that damages may not be awarded to punish the de-
fendant. See, for example, Association Research and Dev. Corp. v. CNA Fin. Corp. (333
N.W.2d 206, 210 [Mich. Ct. App. 1983]). But Michigan allows “exemplary” damages to
compensate plaintiffs for their humiliation, outrage, and indignity resulting from defen-
dants’ willful, malicious, or wanton conduct. See, for example, Kewin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Mich. 1980); Hall v. Claya, 2008 WL 2779882
(Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2008); Association Research, 333 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1983).
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Table 3. Arbitration Awards by Location, 1992–2006
With Positive Award
Arbitration
Awards
(N) N %
With Punitive
Damages (%)
Arizona 140 65 46.4 7.7
California 1,373 666 48.5 10.8
Colorado 267 141 52.8 5.7
District of Columbia 102 55 53.9 7.3
Florida 696 314 45.1 8.3
Georgia 153 80 52.3 22.5
Illinois 140 69 49.3 10.1
Michigan 360 141 39.2 2.8
Minnesota 141 75 53.2 12.0
Missouri 126 60 47.6 18.3
North Carolina 144 77 53.5 7.8
New York 1,114 574 51.5 6.1
Ohio 175 88 50.3 11.4
Other 865 453 52.4 12.1
Pennsylvania 206 93 45.1 2.2
Texas 345 168 48.7 11.9
Missing 456 210 46.1 5.2
Total 6,803 3,329 48.9 9.1
Note. The data consist of 6,803 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers arbitrations decided by 418 arbitrators, which resulted in 3,329
awards of compensatory damages and 304 awards of punitive damages to claimants.
ants, as suggested by the rate at which claimants prevail in Michigan,
to a tendency of Michigan claimants to bring weak claims (or to settle
stronger claims), or to a combination of these factors. The highly sta-
tistically significant interstate difference persists even if Michigan is ex-
cluded.
Table 4 shows the pattern of awards over time. Before discussing its
punitive damages award rates, we note a limitation and a strength of
the sample design. The number of awards should not be interpreted as
evidence of declining numbers of disputes because our sample is not
equally representative of the full sample of awards over time. Recall that
the sample design was based on arbitrators who had made awards from
1998 to 2000 and tracked their awards back to 1992 and forward to
2006. If those arbitrators were not active in a year, the sample would
not include their cases. Given entry and exit of arbitrators, one expects
a declining percentage of the universe of arbitrations to be in our sample
as the years are increasingly distant from the selection years of 1998 to
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Table 4. Arbitration Awards over Time
With Positive Award
Year
Arbitration
Awards
(N) N %
With Punitive
Damages (%)
1992 332 176 53.0 7.4
1993 315 164 52.1 3.0
1994 324 172 53.1 4.1
1995 430 210 48.8 3.3
1996 619 318 51.4 3.1
1997 630 346 54.9 7.2
1998 863 492 57.0 14.0
1999 547 327 59.8 17.1
2000 434 229 52.8 16.2
2001 303 161 53.1 11.2
2002 298 140 47.0 14.3
2003 410 182 44.4 8.8
2004 566 197 34.8 3.6
2005 504 142 28.2 4.9
2006 228 73 32.0 8.2
Total 6,803 3,329 48.9 9.1
Note. The data consist of 6,803 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers arbitrations decided by 418 arbitrators, which resulted in 3,329
awards of compensatory damages and 304 awards of punitive damages to claimants.
2000. For example, the FINRA Web site shows 1,919 NASD awards in
1998 and 2,023 in 2006. The lower proportion of 2006 awards in Table
4 is likely due to the exit from the system of arbitrators selected on the
basis of their 1998–2000 activity.
A strength of the sample design is that it yields a consistent pool of
arbitrators over time. Changes in positive award rates and punitive
award rates over time therefore are not artifacts of a shifting pool of
arbitrators. Changes over time can be more precisely attributed to
changes in law, such as Mastrobuono, or other developments. Moreover,
while we cannot directly compare the number of arbitration awards or
the number of positive awards over time, we can still compare the per-
centages with a positive award and the percentages of the positive awards
with punitive damages for different years.
As a descriptive matter, Table 4 shows notable variation over time.
Punitive damages were awarded in as few as 3.0 percent of claimant
victories in 1993 and in as many as 17.1 percent of claimant victories
in 1999. The increased rate of punitive awards is concentrated in con-
secutive years. After 1996, the rate more than doubled in 1997 and
P U N I T I V E D A M A G E S / 519
almost doubled again in 1998, with 1998 having more than four times
the rate of 1996. Punitive award rates increased noticeably over 1996
levels through 2002 or 2003, declined in 2004 and 2005, and increased
again in 2006.
The strongest candidates we have identified that might explain changes
over time are the Supreme Court’s Mastrobuono decision and the FINRA/
NASD reforms in 1998 and 2004. The decline in stock prices from 2000
to about the middle of 2002 may help explain some of the pattern, since
it likely affected the characteristics of claims in which awards were sought.
But it is not clear that behavior warranting punitive damages as a percentage
of claims should increase during periods of market decline. And note that
the punitive award rate increased or stayed high from 1997 through 2000,
a period of generally increasing stock prices.
Since Mastrobuono most directly affected New York law, we assess
the punitive award rates in New York and non–New York cases over
time. As noted above, the difference between awards adjudicated in New
York and elsewhere may be muted by New York being the choice of
law for some arbitrations conducted in other states. Nevertheless, if
Mastrobuono had an effect, it likely was stronger in New York than in
other states because arbitrations in New York are probably more likely
to have New York law govern than are arbitrations in other states.
Table 5 compares punitive award rates in New York with those in
other states before 1996 and in 1996 or later. Punitive damages for
awards adjudicated in New York were virtually nonexistent before 1996,
with only one punitive award out of 145 complainant victories. This is
consistent with Garrity’s prohibition of punitive awards by arbitrators.
In the 1996 or later period, the New York punitive damages award rate
increased to 7.9 percent from less than 1 percent.
But the story is not simply a New York tale. The punitive award rate
also increased in arbitrations in other states after 1995, although the
increases were smaller than in New York arbitrations. This smaller in-
crease is consistent with (1) New York law being applied in some ar-
bitrations adjudicated outside New York state and (2) Mastrobuono
affecting New York more because of New York arbitrations’ stronger
association with New York as a choice of law.20
20. When Mastrobuono was decided, the securities industry claimed that the decision
would have little effect. “One reason that brokerage officials see little impact from the
ruling is that arbitrators are already free to ignore a contract’s provision and award punitive
damages; yet they rarely do so” (Greenhouse 1995, p. D5). The same article reported that
the rate of punitive damages awards in securities arbitration since 1987 had been about 1
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Explaining the pattern may be further complicated by New York’s
not being the only state with case law that relates to arbitrators and
punitive damages. At least Illinois and Indiana also had relevant doc-
trinal developments. But the pattern of punitive damages awards in these
states suggests that the main effect is in fact a New York one.
In 1992, an Illinois appeals court held that an arbitrator may award
punitive damages if the arbitration agreement expressly so provides (Ed-
wards Electric Co. v. Automation, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 833, 842–43 [Ill.
App. 1992]). Subsequent Illinois case law indicated that arbitration pur-
suant to NASD rules does authorize punitive damages (Cerajewski v.
Kunkle, 674 N.E.2d 57, 60 [Ill. App. 1996]). It appears that the 1992
ruling did not depress punitive award rates in Illinois. Table 3 shows
that arbitrations in Illinois resulted in punitive awards in 10.1 percent
of proceedings with awards to claimants. This rate exceeds the overall
9.1 percent rate of punitive awards. A 1981 Indiana case found that
arbitrators lacked authority to award punitive damages (School City of
East Chicago, Indiana v. East Chicago Federation of Teachers, 422
N.E.2d 656, 663 [Ind. App. 1981]). Yet of nine Indiana awards favoring
claimants in our data (not shown separately in Table 3 because Indiana
was below the 100-award threshold for separate reporting in that table),
three included punitive damages, a 33.3 percent rate, which is above the
9.1 percent average.
In addition to Mastrobuono–New York effects, the FINRA/NASD
1998 and 2004 reforms, intended to reduce industry influence on the
arbitration selection process, might be expected to lead to increased
claimant recoveries. But they sought to promote fairness by adjusting
the selection of arbitrators and did not effect a change in substantive
law such as that in Mastrobuono. Since our award sample is based on
cases associated with individual arbitrators over time, the sample design
likely mutes the effect of changes on the arbitrator selection process.
Table 4 suggests that the 2004 reforms do not appear to be associated
with increased compensatory award rates or punitive award rates. Com-
pensatory award rates declined after 2004 and did not recover to their
percent (Greenhouse 1995). There was evidence of erosion or limiting of Garrity before
Mastrobuono. See, for example, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd. (943 F.2d
1056, 1064 [9th Cir. 1991]), which held that an arbitrator did not act in manifest disregard
of New York law in awarding punitive damages, Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
(569 F. Supp. 821 [M.D.N.C. 1983]), Baravati v. Josephthal Lyon & Ross Inc. (834 F.
Supp. 1023 [N.D. Ill. 1993], judgment aff’d., 28 F.3d 704 [7th Cir. 1994], opinion corrected,
867 F. Supp. 648 [N.D. Ill. 1994]), which held that federal substantive law applies in
awarding punitive damages, and the cases cited in note 9.
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2004 levels by 2006. This decline is not an artifact of our sample, as
FINRA’s own data show declining claimant victory rates in recent years
(Schultz 2008, p. 356). The 1998 reform may have helped sustain the
high level of punitive awards reached in the preceding 2 years, but its
effects are difficult to separate from those of Mastrobuono.
The multiple factors explored above suggest using regression models
to account for more than one factor at a time. Since the dependent
variable in a model of the decision to award punitive damages is di-
chotomous, we employ logistic regression models. In addition, the award
data have a multilevel structure with cases being nested within arbitra-
tors and arbitrators being nested within states. Table 6 reports simple
logistic regression models and a multilevel logistic model of whether an
award with compensatory damages also provided for punitive dam-
ages.21 The simple models include dummy variables for states and cluster
the standard errors by arbitrator to reflect the nonindependence of
awards decided by the same arbitrator. The multilevel model allows for
random coefficients for arbitrators and states and thus allows for var-
iation within arbitrators and states. In addition to the factors discussed
above, the second logistic regression model and the multilevel model
include a dummy variable for whether the respondent appeared at the
arbitration. The respondent did not appear in 20.4 percent of 3,274
awards for which that variable was coded. A respondent’s failure to
appear may be associated with the degree of misbehavior.
As one would expect on the basis of the traditional view of punitive
damages, Table 6 shows that both the degree and the nature of the harm
are associated with arbitrators’ decisions to award punitive damages. In
all three models, the coefficient on the compensatory award variable is
large and significant. Claims of misrepresentation, unauthorized trades,
and, to a lesser degree, theft are associated with the presence of a punitive
award. Their relative strength is consistent across the models. The order
of their strength varies from Table 2, where theft had the strongest
association with the presence of punitive awards. Part of this shift is
due to arbitrations that include theft claims having a significantly higher
mean ($306,000) and median ($112,000) compensatory award than
other claims. The compensatory award variable in the models therefore
tends to mute the effect of theft claims. In addition, as Table 2 shows,
theft claims are the smallest category of claim type, and therefore there
is reduced power to detect a significant effect for them.
21. For discussion of multilevel models, see Gelman and Hill (2007).
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Table 6. Decision to Award Punitive Damages
Logistic Regressions
Model 1 Model 2
Multilevel
Model
Compensatory award (log 10) .769** .707** .719**
(5.94) (4.97) (6.23)
Respondent did not appear 1.089*** 1.140**
(7.74) (7.44)
Claim type:
Suitability or NYSE or NASD rules .086 .152 .175
(.63) (1.07) (1.18)
Churning .163 .140 .124
(.91) (.76) (.69)
Unauthorized trades .668** .609** .631**
(4.13) (3.69) (4.08)
Failure to execute or monitor .366 .358 .319
(1.53) (1.43) (1.36)
Misrepresentation or Rule 10b-5 .881** .822** .883**
(4.65) (4.29) (4.39)
Theft or self-dealing .432 .381 .424
(1.83) (1.55) (1.66)
Constant 7.000** 6.884** 7.259**
(8.43) (7.91) (10.88)
Observations 3,300 3,246 3,246
Note. The data consist of 6,803 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers arbitrations decided by 418 arbitrators from 1992 to 2006, which
resulted in 3,329 awards of compensatory damages and 304 awards of punitive damages to
claimants. The dependent variable is punitive damages awarded. Amounts are in 2007 dollars.
All models include year fixed effects. The number of observations is less than 3,329 because
of missing values for one or more covariates. Since disputes can involve more than one claim,
overlap exists across the types of claims made. Therefore, each claim type is a dummy variable
equal to one if the type of claim is present and zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are
z-statistics. NYSEp New York Stock Exchange; NASDp National Association of Securities
Dealers.
p ! .10.
**p ! .01.
The year dummy variables, included in Table 6 but not reported,
show significant changes over time that correspond to the time effects
shown in the punitive damages award rates in Table 4. The coefficients
are jointly significant at p ! .0001 but show substantial changes over
time. For example, in model 2, the coefficients for the years 1993–97
are negative (relative to the reference category of 1992, with its 7.4
percent punitive damages rate), the coefficients for the years 1998–2003
are positive, and the coefficients for the years 2004–6 shift back to a
negative sign. The pattern of the coefficients does not materially differ
from the pattern of the raw rates. Depending on when one believes that
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Mastrobuono’s effect should begin to appear, the time trends seem con-
sistent with Mastrobuono contributing to an increase in punitive award
rates and those rates receding, along with the claimant win rate, after
2003.
The regression models in Table 6 provide less support for the law
and economics framework to the extent that it is influenced by the
probability of detection. The positive coefficient on the dummy variable
for theft indicates that this claim type is prone to awards of punitive
damages. Yet, as suggested by the discussion of the nonregression results
in Table 2, theft likely has a relatively high probability of detection and,
under the law and economics approach, might be expected to have a
lower rate of punitive awards. A concern about this interpretation is the
association between theft and award levels. The law and economics view
suggests that total damages should increase with harm and egregiousness
(to the extent that there are greater third-party effects), perhaps sug-
gesting increased need for a punitive award in theft cases, which are
egregious and are associated with increased harm. But the models in
Table 6, unlike the data in Table 2, account for the amount of harm as
measured by the compensatory award. So the models at least partly
account for the possibility that increased harm is likely associated with
increased punitive damages under the law and economics view. Even
while controlling for the level of harm, we find that theft cases, with a
presumably high probability of detection, are associated with the exis-
tence of a punitive award—contrary to the law and economics view.
Similarly, churning claims might be expected to be more difficult to
detect than other claims, which the probability-of-detection framework
suggests should lead to a higher rate of punitive awards. In Table 6,
even while controlling for the level of harm, we find that churning cases,
with a presumably relatively low probability of detection, are not as-
sociated with the existence of a punitive award. The coefficient for churn-
ing claims is negative, albeit statistically insignificant.
The positive, significant coefficient for the compensatory award level
does not necessarily suggest that the behavior of arbitrators is inconsis-
tent with the law and economics view. Increased compensatory damages
likely are associated with increased likelihood of detection—it is easier
to detect large harms than small ones. This suggests, holding other fac-
tors constant, an inverse association between the compensatory award
level and the existence of a punitive damages award under the law and
economics view. But greater harm and increased egregiousness can be
associated with an increased likelihood of a punitive award under the
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law and economics view because total damages should be positively
associated with the harm caused. If for some reason compensatory dam-
ages do not fully cover the harm, the law and economics view allows
for a positive association between harm and the existence of a punitive
award.
A concern in using observational data is whether the regression mod-
els are evidence of causative relations or merely evidence of associations.
Propensity score matching can be used to try to add a case control
structure to observational data and therefore to enhance causal inference
based on a treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). For each of the
three claim types (unauthorized trades, misrepresentation, and theft) that
Table 6 suggests are significantly associated with the presence of a pu-
nitive award, we used propensity score matching to further explore the
association. In separate propensity score analyses for each claim type,
the three claim types were designated the treatments and the outcome
was the existence of a punitive damages award. Subject to the limits of
propensity score methodology,22 using propensity scores based on the
compensatory award level, whether a respondent appeared at the ar-
bitration, year, and state confirmed the associations between claim type
and the existence of a punitive award.
3.4. Results: The Relation between Punitive and Compensatory
Awards
We next focus on the amount of the punitive damages award. Inspection
of the distributions of the punitive and compensatory awards shows that
they suffer from extreme skewness. A logarithmic transformation sub-
stantially improves the distributions for purposes of statistical analysis.
Figures 1 and 2 show the punitive and compensatory award distributions
in disputes with both kinds of awards. The transformation produces
reasonably distributed awards, with some concern about outlying low
awards in both distributions. These awards are addressed in the regres-
sion analysis below.
Figure 3 uses the transformed awards to show the relation between
the amount of punitive and compensatory awards. Four arbitrations had
low (less than or equal to $100) compensatory awards and nontrivial
22. Propensity score techniques use dichotomous regression to achieve a balanced
matched sample on the designated covariates between the treatment group and a control
group. They then assess whether the designated treatment is associated with the outcome
of interest. The results are limited by the methodology used to achieve balance and the
quality of the covariates.
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Figure 1. Distribution of punitive awards
Figure 2. Distribution of compensatory awards
punitive awards, and two arbitrations had low (less than or equal to
$100) punitive awards and nontrivial compensatory awards. Except for
these six cases, the overwhelming pattern suggested by Figure 3 is a
linear relation between punitive and compensatory awards.
The obvious linear relation between the punitive award and the key
covariate, the compensatory award, suggests employing linear regression
models to assess the relation between them while accounting for other
factors. We employ two approaches to deal with the outlying data points
suggested by Figure 3. First, we use robust regression models, which
reduce the importance of outliers by assigning them reduced weight in
the model (Rousseeuw and Leroy 2003). Second, we report OLS re-
gression models that exclude the few cases with punitive or compen-
satory awards of less than or equal to $100.
As Table 7 shows, additional variables available in the model include
the claim type described in Table 2. Preliminary models, not reported
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Figure 3. Relation between punitive and compensatory securities arbitration awards, 1992–2006
(N p 303).
here, suggested that state effects were not significant, and therefore they
are not included in the models in Table 7. A multilevel model, with
random intercepts for arbitrators and states, yielded insignificant random
intercept parameters.
Table 7 shows a strong linear association between compensatory and
punitive damages, conditional on a punitive award having been made.
The compensatory award explanatory variable is consistently highly sta-
tistically significant and of similar magnitude across the models. Adding
claim-type dummy variables in models 3 and 6 does not materially in-
crease the models’ explanatory power, but model 6 modestly suggests
that punitive awards are higher in cases with the most egregious claim
type, theft. The modest effect of the claim-type covariates suggests that
once behavior is egregious enough to warrant punitive damages, the
claim type ceases to be important. The consistent significance of the
variable indicating that the respondent did not appear suggests that some
of the most egregious wrongdoers chose not to appear rather than to
present a case to the arbitration panel. Alternatively, arbitrators chose
to punish those respondents with punitive damages. The respondent did
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not appear in 46.3 percent of the 300 awards for which the variable
was coded. Analysis of residuals in the OLS models suggests that basic
regression assumptions are reasonably well satisfied.
The relation between punitive and compensatory awards is consistent
with the traditional framework for state law punitive damages doctrine;
increased punishment is associated with increased harm. But it is also
plausible that one might observe a positive relationship between the
punitive damages and compensatory awards under the law and econom-
ics approach. Higher levels of harm (as measured by the compensatory
award) may lead to a greater punitive damages award under a pure
deterrence approach even where the probability of detection increases
with harm.23
Further analysis suggests that the absence of claim-type effects in
Table 7 has some implications for one aspect of the law and economics
theory of punitive damages. Exploring more deeply the relation between
punitive and compensatory damages within case types provides little
support for the probability that detection plays a role in the arbitrators’
behavior with respect to the relation between punitive and compensatory
awards. Figure 4 shows the relation for each claim type, with a best-
fitting OLS regression line. The graphs show a significant linear relation
between punitive and compensatory awards for each claim type. Robust
regression models, which downplay the importance of outliers, run sep-
arately for each of the claim types, yield a statistically significant com-
pensatory damages coefficient (log) for every claim type, with signifi-
cance levels always less than .001. And the 95 percent confidence
intervals of the compensatory damages coefficient for each of the six
claim types overlap.
This consistency of the relation across claim types provides little evi-
dence that arbitrators behave in a way that is substantially influenced
by the probability of detection. If they did and this was a strong enough
23. As noted in Section 2.1, the law and economics approach posits that total damages
should equal the harm divided by the probability that the wrongdoer will be found liable
(Polinsky and Shavell 1998). As the level of harm increases, the probability of detection
(a necessary step for liability) likely increases as well. However, it is possible that the rate
at which the harm increases will exceed the rate at which the probability of detection
increases, leading to an overall increase in the optimal punitive damages award amount.
For example, suppose the probability of detection (and liability) is equal to .1 when the
harm is $100. Suppose also that the probability of detection rises to .2 when the harm is
$1,000. Even with the rise in the probability of detection, the optimal total damages will
increase from $1,000 to $5,000 as harm increases from $100 to $1,000 (and thus lead to
an increase in the punitive damages amount as well).
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Figure 4. Relation between punitive and compensatory awards by securities arbitration claim type
effect, one might observe more variation in the relation across case types.
For example, as noted above, thefts seem relatively more likely to be
detected, which suggests that lower punitive awards per unit of com-
pensatory awards might be appropriate in such cases. Yet Figure 4f
shows that theft claims have no distinctive slope compared to other claim
types. Similarly, failure to execute a trade would seem to involve a high
probability of detection, yet the slope in Figure 4d shows, if anything,
a steeper slope for failure-to-execute claims than for other claim types.
Churning, which might be expected to be more difficult to detect than
theft or failure to execute, does not exhibit the steeper slope that the
probability-of-detection theory might forecast. But absent more precise
evidence about the probability of detection, evidence that is likely dif-
ficult to gather, one cannot rule out the influence of the probability model
on arbitrators’ behavior.
Although our primary interest in the level of punitive awards, tracking
the Supreme Court’s constitutional punitive damages doctrine, is the
relation between punitive and compensatory awards, given a compen-
satory award, we note that Tobit models have been used to account for
the presence of many punitive awards of zero in some analyses (for
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example, Hersch and Viscusi 2004, p. 24). As a further check on our
results, we therefore employed Tobit models that included all 3,246 cases
with a compensatory award and necessary data for the explanatory
variables, with censoring designated to occur at punitive awards of zero.
The explanatory variables were the compensatory award (log), claim-
type indicator variables, state indicator variables, year indicator vari-
ables, and an indicator variable for whether the respondent appeared.
The significance of the results for the claim-type coefficients did not
materially differ from the results in Table 6, and the compensatory award
variable was highly statistically significant.24
4. DISCUSSION
In addition to their implications for the traditional and law and eco-
nomics approaches to punitive damages, the securities arbitration results
yield insights relating to three major topics. First are the implications
for evaluating arbitrators’ performance in the securities industry. Second
is what the results reveal when comparing securities arbitration and other
arbitration systems. Third are the results’ implications for the compar-
ative performance of arbitrators, juries, and judges.
Our results focus necessarily, because of data constraints, on only
observable arbitration awards and settlements. Most securities arbitra-
tions, however, settle. To the extent that factors that cause parties to
settle securities arbitrations are related to the expectation of possible
punitive awards, our findings may not accurately reflect the true un-
derlying propensity for securities arbitrators to grant punitive awards.
For example, if respondents seek to settle all cases in which they expect
a punitive award, then our observed data will report few punitive awards
24. Whatever their value as a check on other modeling results, Tobit models often are
used in the presence of many actual (not censored) zero values for the dependent variable.
But that use is questionable. Tobit models presume censoring of values, often at zero, but
not the presence of many, uncensored, actual values of zero. Maddala (1992, p. 341) warns
about the misuse of Tobit models in the presence of actual, not censored, zero values. The
questionable results to which Tobit models can lead in modeling adjudicative outcomes
are illustrated in Eisenberg, Wells, and Zhang (2009). Tobit models also require some
adjustment when the nonzero observations are lognormally distributed, as here, because
a simple log transformation renders the many zero values undefined. We used two Tobit
models. One assigned the value of $1 to the zero-award cases before the log transformation,
thereby preserving those observations for analysis after the log transformation. A second
model left the punitive award untransformed. The models yielded results that were not
materially different.
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(because of settlement). A low rate of punitive awards may not mean
that arbitrators are reluctant to grant such awards; instead, a low rate
may simply mean that the most egregious cases have settled. The set-
tlement problem, nonetheless, is one that is endemic to court-based stud-
ies of punitive awards as well. Defendants may also settle cases before
a judge or jury where the defendants expect a possible punitive damages
award. The evidence from a study in which the seeking of punitive
damages was tracked suggested no association between seeking punitive
damages and settlement (Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico 2005). Moreover,
both Kondo (2009) and Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard (2010) estimate mod-
els on the decision to settle a securities arbitration (using the limited
available data on settled cases). While they do not directly focus on
punitive awards, they find that the decision to settle is not correlated
with various other factors important to the outcome of arbitration (in-
cluding factors relating to the background of the arbitrators).
4.1. Performance of Securities Arbitrators
With respect to the functioning of securities arbitrations, the results for
punitive damages do not support the most extreme fears about arbitrator
bias. The fact that arbitrators award any punitive damages in a nontrivial
fraction of cases is itself notable. We suspect, and some of our colleagues’
informal reactions suggest, that many observers were unaware that ar-
bitrators ever awarded punitive damages and certainly unaware that such
awards were a regular feature of securities arbitrations. An earlier in-
formal estimate that punitive awards occur in only about 1 percent of
arbitrations (Greenhouse 1995, p. D5) turns out to be substantially too
conservative. A similar phenomenon existed with respect to judges. Until
the Civil Justice Survey by the BJS (1996),25 the topic of punitive damages
awards by judges was largely unexplored (Eisenberg et al. 2006, p. 289).
The existence of hundreds of punitive damages awards in one area of
arbitration suggests that punitive damages need to be considered from
a broader perspective than one focused solely on court-based litigation.
In some years, the arbitrators awarded punitive damages in over 15
percent of the investor wins, and those were years in which investors
prevailed in over 50 percent of the disputes. Since the arbitrators studied
here are traced as a cohort over time, it seems unlikely that declines in
the punitive award rate to less than 5 percent, as in the years 2004 and
25. Subsequent Civil Justice Surveys are reported in BJS (2004, 2008). The 1992 Civil
Justice Survey (BJS 1995) did not include data on judge trials.
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2005, should be attributed to arbitrators unwilling to make punitive
awards. The low-rate years are likely more a function of whatever forces
have been driving down over time the rate at which claimants prevail
in arbitration (as shown in Table 4), of possible changes in the rate or
patterns of settlements that we cannot systematically observe, and of
possible shifts in the merits of claims brought by investors over time.
The amount of securities arbitrators’ punitive damages awards is also
revealing. Model 4 in Table 7 shows that half the variance in the punitive
award can be explained by the compensatory award. Although variance
measures such as R2-values can be spuriously high, inspection of Figure
3 indicates that the variance measure in this sample is not misleading.
Given that we lack a precise direct measure of the egregiousness of
respondents’ misbehavior at the individual award level, the ability to
explain so much of the punitive award is impressive. Even the summary
statistics on amounts in Table 1 are revealing. In awards with a punitive
component, the median of both the punitive and the compensatory
amount is about $100,000, and the mean of each is between $400,000
and $450,000. This summary one-to-one relation is not far from the
coefficient of about .83 for the compensatory award in the regression
models. A 1 percent increase in the compensatory award thus corre-
sponds to about a .83 percent increase in the punitive award. There truly
is a sense in which the arbitrators appear to be using the relation of the
awards to try to make the punishment fit the crime.
4.2. Comparison with Employment Awards
Considering information from areas other than securities arbitration can
help place the securities arbitration results in perspective. Since the se-
curities arbitration award data, like most data about adjudication, lack
information to allow us to control for case strength, it is difficult to
know what to make of the absolute rates and amounts of awards. The
overall win rate of investor claimants in our data set was 48.9 percent.
This compares to win rates of 64.9 percent observed in American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA) employment arbitration claims by highly
paid employees and 39.6 percent in AAA employment arbitration claims
by lower paid employees, in a sample of 297 AAA arbitrations initiated
in 1999 and 2000 (Eisenberg and Hill 2003–4, p. 48). Table 1 shows
that the mean compensatory recovery in the 3,329 awards won by claim-
ants was $156,000 and the median recovery was $44,000. In AAA ar-
bitrations for highly paid employees, the mean award was about
$212,000 and the median award was about $95,000 (Eisenberg and Hill
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2003–4, pp. 49–50). For lower paid employees, the mean award was
about $31,000 and the median award was about $13,000 (Eisenberg
and Hill 2003–4, pp. 49–50). We do not have systematic information
about punitive damage awards in the AAA data.
The ordinal ranking of the claimant win rates is the same as that of
the median awards: highly paid employees win most often, securities
claimants rank next, and lower paid employees rank third. This pattern
may suggest that increased resources are associated with claimant ar-
bitration success. Perhaps the highest paid employees have the greatest
resources and/or the most skilled counsel, which enables them to achieve
the most favorable outcomes.26 The lower paid employees likely have
access to fewer resources than the other two claimant groups. These
conclusions must be tentative until we have better information about
arbitration settlement patterns in securities arbitrations.27
4.3. Comparison with the Relation between Punitive and
Compensatory Awards in Litigation
Arbitration’s monopoly over disputes between securities customers and
brokerage firms (or -brokers) precludes meaningful comparison with
litigation win rates in similar cases because no substantial, competing
court-based dispute resolution mechanism exists for such disputes (Choi,
Fisch, and Pritchard 2010). The securities arbitration data do, however,
offer an unusual opportunity for comparison with other types of liti-
gation with respect to punitive award amounts. In general, comparisons
of dispute resolution processes such as arbitration and litigation are
limited by the routing of cases. Because parties route different cases to
arbitration and litigation, plaintiff win rates in litigation may not be
readily comparable with plaintiff win rates in securities arbitration. In
addition, when comparing cases involving different subject matter, sub-
stantive legal differences (as well as differing propensities to settle) may
lead to different win rates. Similarly, punitive award patterns may sig-
nificantly differ for reasons other than adjudicators’ behavior.
These concerns recede (but do not vanish) when, instead of comparing
win rates or absolute levels of punitive damages, we compare the relation
of compensatory awards to punitive awards across arbitration and lit-
igation. The question of interest is, for any given level of compensatory
26. But in models of whether claimants prevail in securities arbitrations, the coefficient
on the amount claimed (log) was not close to statistically significant.
27. The settlement rate in American Arbitration Association employment disputes was
in the 40–50 percent range (Eisenberg and Hill 2003–4, p. 52).
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award (indicating a similar level of wrongdoing and egregious misbe-
havior), how much do punitive awards differ across adjudicators? The
differential routing of cases is less important if one accepts that regardless
of the decision maker—whether jury, judge, or arbitrator—the compen-
satory award reflects the level of wrongdoing and egregiousness in the
case. The relevant question can be framed as the simple quantitative
inquiry of how great the punishment was given the adjudicator’s measure
of harm and egregious misbehavior (as given by the level of compen-
satory award). In litigated cases, once behavior is found to be sufficiently
egregious to support punitive damages, neither case category nor locale
substantially aided in explaining the level of punitive awards (Eisenberg
et al. 1997, p. 649). In addition, no significant difference was found
between judges and juries in the relation between punitive and com-
pensatory awards (Eisenberg et al. 2006). We therefore predict that re-
gardless of forum (and indeed subject matter of case), the relation be-
tween the compensatory award and punitive damages should be similar.
To compare the arbitration results with litigation results requires data
on punitive damages in litigation. We use the BJS data sets containing
data gathered directly from state court clerks’ offices on tort, contract,
and property cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year 1991–92 (referred
to here as 1992) and then calendar years 1996 and 2001. The data sets
cover state courts of general jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of
the 75 most populous counties in the United States.28 The 75 counties
sampled include approximately 33 percent of the 1990 U.S. population;
the actual 45 counties contributing data account for approximately 20
percent of the population. The initial data set, 1992, includes only jury
trials. The 1996 and 2001 data sets include jury and bench trials. The
three data sets include all completed trials in all three years in most of
the counties. Sampling in the 1992 and 1996 data sets is described in
earlier publications (BJS 1995, 1996, 2004). Together the three BJS data
sets contain 438 jury trials with punitive and compensatory awards and
96 judge trials with punitive and compensatory awards. The relation
between the awards in the BJS data is explored in detail elsewhere (Ei-
senberg et al. 2006).
28. The 2001 data included 46 counties; the 1991–92 and 1996 data included 45. One
county included in the 1991–92 and 1996 study, Norfolk County, Mass., fell out of the
nation’s 75 most populous in the 2000 census and was replaced by Mecklenburg County,
N.C., and El Paso County, Tex. Two Maryland counties declined to participate in the
1991–92 study and were replaced by Fairfax County, Va., for all three iterations of the
Civil Justice Survey.
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Figure 5. Relation between punitive and compensatory awards by adjudicator
Our focus here is on whether the relation between awards is similar
across different adjudicators. The scatterplots in Figure 5 show the re-
lation between punitive and compensatory awards for juries and judges
in the BJS data. All amounts are in inflation-adjusted 2007 dollars. As
in Figure 3, both groups of adjudicators shows a strong linear correlation
between the punitive award and the compensatory award. Comparison
of Figures 3 and 5 suggests that not only do the three sets of adjudicators
each exhibit a linear relation, but the linear relations do not materially
differ. The clusters of data points slope upward from lower left to upper
right at approximately the same angle.
Table 8 combines the results from model 1 in Table 7 with the results
of similar regressions in litigation using the BJS data, broken down by
judge and jury trials. The models show the similarity of the relation
between punitive and compensatory awards across adjudicators. The
coefficients on the compensatory award are each highly statistically sig-
nificant. Interestingly, the slope of the jury line is between those of the
judge and arbitrator lines. These results are consistent with other studies
of the relation between awards (Hyman et al. 2007, p. 25; Eisenberg et
al. 1997, p. 651). The variance in the punitive-to-compensatory ratio
across the three adjudicator groups is not consistently statistically sig-
nificantly different.29
29. Initially, a test of the hypothesis that the variance of the punitive-to-compensatory
ratio is equal across the three adjudicator groups can be rejected at p p .008 (Levene’s
test). But this result is sensitive both to the inclusion of outcomes with low compensatory
awards (which tend to have high variance in the punitive-to-compensatory ratio; Eisenberg,
Heise, and Wells 2010) and to the measure of central tendency used. If one limits the
sample to outcomes with compensatory awards of at least $1,000, the significance level is
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Table 8. Robust Regression Models of Punitive Damages Awards by Adjudicator Type
Arbitrators Juries Judges
Compensatory award (log 10) .850* .832* .811*
(22.34) (24.55) (10.62)
Constant .741* .664* .682
(3.84) (3.76) (1.82)
Observations 302 438 96
Note. The dependent variable is punitive award (log 10). The data for arbitrators consist of
303 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/National Association of Securities Dealers ar-
bitrations from 1992 to 2006 that contained a punitive and a compensatory award. Jury and
judge data are from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Numbers in parentheses are absolute
values of t-statistics.
 p ! .10.
*p ! .01.
In models that include dummy variables for juries and judges (with
arbitrators as the reference category), and interaction terms between
groups and the compensatory award, a test of the hypothesis that the
jury-group dummy variable and interaction term jointly significantly
differ from zero is significant at p p .43. A test of the hypothesis that
the judge-group dummy variable and interaction term jointly signifi-
cantly differ from zero is significant at p p .003.30 Since both the slope
and the intercept in the arbitrator model are higher than in the judge
model, this is some evidence that arbitrators differ more from judges
than they do from juries and tend to award higher punitive damages
per unit of compensatory damages than do judges.
An important result evident from Figures 3 and 5 and Table 8 is that
the relation between punitive and compensatory awards in the studied
data sets does not materially differ between arbitrators and juries. This
has implications for the Supreme Court’s view of the relation. In Exxon
.448. If one tests for equality with respect to the median punitive-to-compensatory ratio
rather than the mean, the significance level is .298 (Brown-Forsythe test) for all outcomes
and .754 for outcomes with compensatory awards of at least $1,000.
30. One concern is that the three sets of adjudicators deal with disputes with different
levels of compensatory damages. The x-axis in Figure 3 shows that the bulk of arbitrator
compensatory awards are in the range of $10,000 to $1 million (104 to 106, on the log
scale). In Figure 5, the data for judges are similarly centered, but the data for juries have
many observations below and above this range. We therefore ran models that limit the
data to disputes with compensatory awards in the $10,000 to $1 million range. A test of
the hypothesis that the jury-group dummy variable and interaction term are jointly sig-
nificantly different from zero is significant at p p .24. A test of the hypothesis that the
judge-group dummy variable and interaction term are jointly significantly different from
zero is significant at p p .0001.
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Shipping Co. v. Baker (128 S. Ct. 2624–25), the Court found unac-
ceptably high variability in the pattern of awards in the BJS data.31 The
Court used high variability in the punitive-to-compensatory ratio in jury
trials to justify imposing limits, as a matter of federal court regulation
of maritime cases, on punitive awards.32 Our results suggest little ma-
terial difference between the pattern of jury awards that concerned the
Court and the pattern of awards by relatively more experienced securities
arbitrators, over 80 percent of whom are attorneys.
The modest difference between arbitrators and juries is all the more
striking because of likely stabilizing aspects of securities arbitration.
Arbitrators tend to be repeat players much more than do juries. The
over 6,800 arbitrations in our data were decided by only 418 arbitrators.
So, on average, the securities arbitrators each observed about 16 dis-
putes, many more than the average juror in a civil case conceivably
observes. Since our data cover only the time period from 1992 to 2006,
the average arbitrator probably observes more disputes than those con-
sidered in our data set. The average arbitrator not only observes many
more disputes than the average juror but also observes disputes limited
by subject area. Every case in our securities data set is of course about
a dispute between a securities customer and a brokerage firm (or broker).
In this sense, securities arbitrators encounter little case category varia-
tion. They tend to have a pool of cases, based on their personal expe-
rience, with which to compare each dispute. Each arbitrator can inter-
nally calibrate degrees of misbehavior to arrive at results that reflect the
variability of behavior across cases. Vastly greater adjudicatory expe-
rience and more constant dispute subject matter should lead to less
variability in punitive awards in arbitrations than in litigation, holding
the compensatory award constant.
The similarity shown in Figures 3 and 5 suggests that either the
experienced arbitration professionals are intolerably varying in their
awards or the pattern of juries’ awards that concerned the Court in
31. See also Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co. (2008 WL 5378011, *10 n.15 [3d Cir.
2008]), a case reducing a punitive award that noted the reduced award in Exxon.
32. The Court stated, “[E]vidence that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards falls within a reasonable zone . . . fails to tell us whether the spread between high
and low individual awards is acceptable. The available data suggest it is not. A recent
comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded by juries in state civil trials found a
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards of just .62:1, but a mean ratio of
2.90:1 and a standard deviation of 13.81” (128 S. Ct. 2625). For evidence that the Court
erred in relying on the high variability in the punitive-to-compensatory ratio to conclude
that the ratio was too erratic, see Eisenberg, Heise, and Wells (2010).
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Table 9. Rate of Punitive Damages Awards by Adjudicator and Nature of Injury, 1992–2006
Confidence
Interval
Adjudicator
Bodily
Injury
Awards
(N)
Disputes
Won
(N)
Award
Rate
(%)
Lower
95%
Upper
95%
Securities arbitrator No 304 3,329 9.1 8.2 10.1
Jury No 274 2,374 11.5 10.3 12.8
Judge No 74 2,110 3.5 2.8 4.4
Jury (no MV) Yes 114 2,697 4.2 3.5 5.0
Judge (no MV) Yes 25 187 13.4 8.4 18.3
Jury (MV) Yes 57 3,928 1.5 1.1 1.8
Judge (MV) Yes 3 273 1.1 .0 2.3
Note. Securities arbitrator data consist of 3,329 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority/
National Association of Securities Dealers arbitrations, 304 of which contained a punitive
award. The BJS (1992) data do not include judge trials. MV p motor vehicles.
Exxon should be reconsidered in light of evidence about how legal pro-
fessionals perform. If the punitive awards given by juries are no more
variable than the awards by judges and relatively more experienced ar-
bitrators, the variation in jury awards may in fact turn on factors (unob-
servable in our data set) that correspond to the egregiousness of the
underlying conduct. At the very least, juries do not pose any greater risk
of arbitrariness in punitive damage awards than do more expert judges
and arbitrators.
As noted above, rates of awarding punitive damages are less com-
parable across adjudicators than is the relation between punitive and
compensatory awards because of case routing (and differences in the
underlying case subject matter). And a key variable to assess punitive
award rates, whether the plaintiffs in a case sought punitive damages,
is not available in the data sets analyzed here. Nevertheless, noting the
rates of punitive awards can help place results for adjudicator groups
in perspective. The 9.1 percent punitive damages award rate in securities
arbitrations is notably higher than the overall rate of punitive awards
where the plaintiff prevailed in either jury trials or judge trials. Of 11,610
trials won by plaintiffs in the BJS Civil Justice Surveys, 4.6 percent had
punitive awards. The punitive award rate in 2,570 bench trials was 3.9
percent, and that in 9,040 jury trials was 4.9 percent (Eisenberg et al.
2006, p. 269).
The punitive award rates of judges and juries varies significantly by
the type of injury in a case. Table 9 reports the rates for arbitrators,
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judges, and juries. The judge and jury data are further broken down by
cases with bodily injury and without it and by cases involving motor
vehicles and not involving them. Securities arbitrations are presumed
not to have bodily injury.
For the BJS surveys combined, in non-motor-vehicle cases involving
bodily injury, juries awarded punitive damages in 114 of 2,697 trials
won by plaintiffs (4.2 percent), and judges awarded punitive damages
in 25 of 187 plaintiff wins (13.4 percent). For cases without bodily injury
in these years, juries awarded punitive damages in 274 of 2,374 plaintiff
trial wins (11.5 percent), and judges awarded punitive damages in 74
of 2,110 plaintiff wins (3.5 percent). Both differences are highly statis-
tically significant (p ! .001). For disputes without bodily injury, the
arbitrators’ punitive award rate fell between those of judges and juries.
The arbitrators’ rate was significantly lower than that of juries and sig-
nificantly higher than that of judges. If one accounts for the depressed
rate of arbitrator punitive awards prior to Mastrobuono, the arbitrators’
punitive award rate increases and becomes quite close to that for juries.
We suspect that the significant differences in the punitive award rates
of judges and juries in subgroups of cases have much to do with case
routing. For the purposes of assessing arbitrators’ punitive award rates,
the data for judges and juries suggest that arbitrator rates are in the
same general range as juries’ punitive award rates in cases without bodily
injury.
5. CONCLUSION
The substantial rate of punitive awards by securities arbitrators does
not support the most extreme views of arbitrators as systematically hos-
tile to investors. Nor are arbitrators randomly granting punitive dam-
ages. The factors that influence the award of punitive damages and the
strong association between punitive and compensatory awards are evi-
dence of an underlying rationality to arbitrators’ behavior. Nonetheless,
without evidence of the strength of the merits of investor claims, we
cannot evaluate the overall fairness of the FINRA process. The declining
rate of investor success in recent years raises concerns beyond the scope
of this study.
The similarity in punitive damages patterns of relatively more experi-
enced repeat-player arbitrators and less experienced lay juries can inform
discussion about the performance of juries. Over a decade ago, the BJS Civil
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Justice Survey documented the existence of a nontrivial punitive damages
award rate for judges. The FINRA data studied here establish the existence
of a nontrivial award rate for arbitrators. The existence of nontrivial punitive
damage award rates in two groups of legal professionals (judges and repeat-
player arbitrators), and similarities to juries’ punitive awards behavior, sug-
gest that punitive damage awards in jury trials are not the random acts of
arbitrary lay adjudicators. Professionals often are moved by egregious mis-
behavior to impose civil punishment. The similarities suggest that juries
respond to similar factors.
The narrow focus on juries in punitive damages discussions is likely
an artifact of most tort trials being jury trials, but that should not blind
us to the similar performance of legal professionals. The jury-centered
focus of the debate over punitive damages cannot be justified by ex-
traordinary patterns of juror behavior in comparison to judges and se-
curities arbitrators. The similarities in punitive rates and in the significant
relation between punitive and compensatory damages also suggest re-
examining the import of the variability in jury punitive awards that
concerned the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.
Our results also have implications regarding which conceptual frame-
work best describes the pattern of arbitrators’ punitive awards. Since
the traditional view of punitive damages dominates the state law doctrine
that arbitrators are bound to enforce, it is not surprising that we find
evidence that more egregious classes of misbehavior, such as theft, are
associated with an increased likelihood of punitive awards. This view
also suggests that greater harm, as represented by increased compen-
satory damages, should be associated with an increased likelihood and
elevated levels of punitive awards. Firm conclusions about the law and
economics view that punitive awards should be inversely associated with
the probability of detection are difficult to reach because of the absence
of detailed case-level evidence about the probability of detection. To the
extent that claim types can be reasonable proxies for the probability of
detection, we do not find evidence that the probability-of-detection com-
ponent of the law and economics model substantially contributes as a
positive matter to explaining the pattern of punitive awards. This ab-
sence of evidence, nonetheless, does not preclude the probability of de-
tection from playing a role at the individual case level. Our conclusion
on the lack of descriptive power of the law and economics view also
does not reflect on the normative case for the view. Indeed, advocates
of the law and economics view may wish to consider reforms in the way
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punitive damages are determined to increase the relevance of deterrence
in such awards.
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